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Abstract
Economic theory predicts that the consumption path of unconstrained
homeowners responds to the interest rate, while the consumption path of
credit constrained homeowners is determined by the size and timing of
payments (mortgage maturity). We exploit the rapid expansion of mort-
gage markets during the last decade in Spain and a very detailed survey
on household ￿nances to estimate group-speci￿c consumption responses to
changes in the credit conditions. Our estimates suggest that the consump-
tion of households headed by an individual with high school responds more
to mortgage maturity than to the interest rate spread. The consumption
of the rest of indebted households is insensitive to loan maturity. Those re-
sults are con￿rmed when we instrument loan maturity exploiting the fact
that banks are reluctant to o⁄er contracts with age at maturity above 65.
An interpretation of those results is that households headed by middle
education individuals, 8% of our sample, behave as credit constrained.
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1NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Basic economic theory predicts that changes in the mortgage market condi-
tions, like longer periods to repay and lower borrowing costs have a heteroge-
neous impact on the consumption of home owners. The consumption of house-
holds who pay higher borrowing rates and who expect higher income growth
late in life should be especially responsive to the size and timing of mortgage
installments, which in turn is determined by the initial length of a mortgage.
Alternatively, the consumption of credit unconstrained groups is unrelated to
the size of periodic mortgage installments but reacts instead to changes in in-
terest rates. We use the retrospective information on house purchases in the
2002 and 2005 waves of the Spanish Survey on Household Finances to estimate
the response of household consumption to cross-sectional changes in mortgage
maturity and in ￿nancing rates for various groups of the population.
We ￿rst examine income growth for di⁄erent groups of households, based on
the education of the head. Consistently with other evidence on the Spanish labor
market, we ￿nd that households where the head has a high school degree have
the highest average earnings growth late in life among the groups we consider.
We also ￿nd that that group pays higher than average mortgage interest rates.
Guided by that evidence, we use education as an indicator of credit constraints.
An alternative sample split uses household income.
We document that the consumption response to interest rates and maturities
is rather heterogeneous across groups of house owners. When we split the sample
by the educational level of the head of the household, we ￿nd that the level
of consumption is related negatively to interest rates only among the college
educated. Increases in mortgage maturity of 5 years increase consumption by
about 5%, but only among households headed by a person with high school.
That estimate does not vary much when we account for the possibility that
borrowers have special preferences for consumption, but becomes about three
times higher when we control for unobserved variables that a⁄ect consumption
and mortgage conditions. Alternative sample splits based on household income
also suggest that the negative relationship between consumption and mortgage
2interest rate exists only among house owners in the top income quartile, while
we ￿nd a positive response of consumption to mortgage maturity only among
house owners in the central quartiles of the income distribution.
Overall, the sizable response of consumption to mortgage maturity among
households whose head has a high school degree together with evidence about
that group having higher income growth late in life compared to the rest of
the population lead us to characterize the mid-education group as credit con-
strained. The evidence from the alternative sample split using current income
suggests that households in the second and third quartiles of the income dis-
tribution behave like credit constrained. According to our interpretation, the
share of constrained households in Spain would be around 32% of home owners
or 8% of the total population.
31 Introduction
Do the initial mortgage conditions when a house is purchased have a lasting
impact on the consumption path of home-owners? If so, which particular com-
ponents of credit developments matter? The answer to those questions is crucial
to understand the consequences of likely future changes in the access to mort-
gage loans and to assess to what extent credit constraints a⁄ect consumption.
Our study uses a very complete data set of household ￿nances and the episode
of the development of mortgage markets during the last decade in Spain to
estimate the long-term consequences of relaxation of mortgage conditions on
household consumption. Using a simple model of consumption, we argue that
the response of household consumption to initial loan maturity and to interest
rates is informative about the prevalence of credit constraints in the economy.
An interesting literature has examined the contemporaneous impact of par-
ticular aspects of credit market developments on household consumption. Leth
Petersen (2006) analyzed the heterogeneity in the consumption responses to
the possibility of borrowing against home equity. In particular, he studied a
reform of the market of credit in Denmark that enabled house owners to use
housing equity as a collateral in consumption loans, ￿nding that younger house-
holds react much more to access to credit than other (presumably, not liquidity
constrained) households. Other studies focus on the marginal propensity of
consumption out of housing wealth. Campbell and Cocco (2006) estimate that
increases in the value of the house increase the consumption of older home-
owners, possibly through the channel of an increased perceived wealth and a
higher collateralization possibility.1 Besley et al (2008) estimate the response of
aggregate and cohort-speci￿c consumption to changes in interest rates charged
to new mortgages.
1Disney et al. (2010) stress the importance of unobserved expectations about future in-
come. Using the fact that only unanticipated changes in the house value have an impact on
consumption, they estimate that young households do not react di⁄erently than older house-
holds. Bover (2008), using the same dataset as we do, found that the marginal propensity to
consume out of changes in the house value was heterogeneous across households, in particular
were greater for prime age households, consistent with a precautionary saving motive.
4Our study uses the theoretical insights from Attanasio et al. (2008) to argue
that, in the presence of credit constraints, di⁄erent dimensions of the devel-
opment of credit markets can have a lasting impact on the consumption of
di⁄erent groups of home owners over the life of a mortgage. In particular, the
consumption of households with unrestricted access to credit is determined by
the discounted stream of payments, and reacts mostly to changes in the bor-
rowing rate. Conversely, the consumption path of credit constrained households
reacts mostly to the size and timing of the debt repayment payments during the
￿rst years of the life of a mortgage (determined by loan maturity) and less to
interest rates. Hence, examining only a particular dimension of credit market
development (say, drops in interest rates) on contemporaneous expenditure may
lead to an underestimation of the consumption response to changes in the access
to credit. We examine if there is heterogeneity of the consumption response to
mortgage conditions by households that are likely to di⁄er in their access to
credit.
Spain is an interesting case to examine for various reasons. First, between
1996 and 2005 access to mortgage credit became much easier. Average maturity
increased from 18 to 25 years, the average interest rate spread fell by 110 bp,
reducing the amount of the down payment of the households. Parallel to such
changes in credit markets, there was a drop in the aggregate household saving
rate that fell from 16% in 1995 to 11% in 2005.
The second reason is the possibility of using joint information on consump-
tion and credit conditions in the 2002 and 2005 waves of the Spanish Survey
of Household Finances (EFF, by its Spanish initals). The survey contains in-
formation on actual consumption and a rich set of retrospective information on
mortgage conditions. Hence, the EFF provides an unique setup to understand
the impact on household consumption to changes in loan maturity and interest
rates.
Finally, the home ownership ratio exceeds 80% in Spain. Within the subset
of households who became owners after 1992, 80% ￿nanced the transaction using
a mortgage. Therefore, changes in the credit conditions can be an impact on
5aggregate consumption.
Linked to these advantages, there are several challenges. First, observed
maturity and interest rates are the result of a matching between the demand
for mortgages of the families and the supply of loans from the banks￿ side.
Therefore both maturity and interest rate variables are likely to be correlated
with unobserved characteristics of the household. We argue that increases in
loan maturity do not a⁄ect all potential purchasers equally because banks are
reluctant to o⁄er mortgages expiring when the loan applicant is older than 65.
Hence, younger home owners in periods of higher competition for mortgages are
likely to obtain longer maturities than other households. Following Besley et
al. (2008) we instrument interest rates using averages within cells de￿ned by
education, age and year of purchase. A second challenge is selection; theory
has predictions on the impact of credit conditions on the households that have
a mortgage. We use survey information about credit rejections to identify a
selection model and correct our estimates for selection bias.
Our results suggest that there is heterogeneity in the consumption responses
to interest rates and mortgage maturity. An increase of one year in maturity
increase the total consumption of house owners with a high school degree by
3-5% while a decrease of interest rates of 100 bp is not associated to signi￿cant
consumption responses. Nevertheless, the consumption of house owners with
a college degree is insensitive to the size of mortgage installments. We ￿nd
some evidence suggesting that the consumption of those households responds
to changes in interest rates, but the estimates are imprecise. Overall, those
results together with di⁄erences in the income growth late in life and in the
cost of borrowing across education groups suggest that households headed by
an individual with high school are credit constrained, while households headed
by an individual with either college or basic schooling are not. Further sam-
ple splits by household income suggest that consumption correlates negatively
with interest rates only among households in the top income quartile, while it
correlates positively with maturities for households in the mid quartiles of the
income distribution.
6The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the
evolution of the market of mortgages in Spain in the last two decades, and
summarizes a model that motivates our strategy. Section 3 presents the data
and the empirical strategy. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results and Section 6
concludes.
2 The evolution of credit market conditions in
Spain
Access to credit and, specially, access to mortgage debt became easier in many
countries between 1995 and 2007. Table 1 in the Appendix shows the evolution
of mortgage conditions at purchase in Spain -as recollected by the reference
person in the household. The percentage of ￿xed rate mortgages decreased be-
tween 1995 and 2007 by almost a half. The average loan to value ratio increased
from 75% - for mortgages signed between 1991 and 1995- to 91% ￿mortgages
signed after 2003. Loan maturity increased on average from 18 to 23 years and
the interest rate spread from Spanish government bonds fell from 2% to 1.5%.
Together with those changes, the saving ratio fell to historical lows.
To give a sense of the magnitudes involved, assume a 90,000 euro loan signed
in 1995 at 4% interest rate, to be repaid in 15 years. Assuming constant in-
stallments, the yearly installment would be 7,772 euro. The same loan at a
loan maturity of 25 years would involve paying 5,631 euro per month. Us-
ing the median level of gross household income of 31,000 euro and an income
tax of 25%, the reduction in the yearly installment would be about (7,772-
5,631)/(.75*31,000)=9% of yearly net earnings.
2.1 Theoretical considerations
We use a simple model of durable purchases to illustrate how variation in ac-
cess to credit among households results in di⁄erent responses of consumption to
changes in the cost of borrowing (interest rates) and in installment size (mort-
7gage maturities). We build on Attanasio et al. (2008).2
Preferences. Agents live for three periods: the initial period when purchases
take place and two additional periods when the loan can be repaid. Agents
derive utility from the ￿ ow of non-durable consumption in each of the three
periods (c1;c2;c3) and from the stock of housing purchased h: The utility func-
tion is time separable and isoelastic with ￿ < 1:The stock of housing cannot be
resold or augmented and does not depreciate over time.
Endowments: Individuals receive an exogenous stream of earnings (y1;y2;y3)
. There is a set of agents who receive most of their lifetime earnings in the third
period of life -ie. for whom income growth is high relative to their intertemporal
discount rate.3
Timing of purchases: The agents choose the amount of housing consumed in
the ￿rst period, as well as non-durable consumption in the rest of the periods.
The price of housing is assumed to be 1.
Credit markets: There is a single asset and a single liability. The interest
rate on the asset ra is smaller or equal than the cost of borrowing rb. We
assume that, for a set of agents - credit constrained households- interest rates
on saving are strictly smaller than the cost of borrowing rb. The only way to
obtain credit in this economy for credit constrained households is by getting a
mortgage during the ￿rst period. In particular, agents choose to borrow the
amount ￿h, where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: ￿ = 1 implies that the agent does not make
a downpayment at the time of the purchase. Finally, loan maturities M are
exogenously set by banks as either 1 (the full amount is repaid in the second
period) or 2 (the amount borrowed is repaid in the second and third periods
2That model was originally intended to understand the loans in the market of cars. See
Alessie et al. (1997) for a similar set up. We extend some the insights in that work to the
housing market.
3The exact condition is
￿
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where ￿ is the intertemporal discount rate, rb is the cost of borrowing, ￿ the weight of
housing in the utility function, ￿ the risk aversion parameter and y1;y2;y3 the stream of
earnings.















c1 + h(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ y1 (1)
c2 + P ￿ (1 + ra)[y1 ￿ c1 ￿ h(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ y2 (2)
c3+[￿h(1+rb)￿P](1+rb)￿(1+ra)[y2￿c2￿P+(1+rb)(y1￿c1￿h(1￿￿)] ￿ y3 (3)
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
0 ￿ P ￿ h(1 + rb)
where ci is the consumption of non housing goods for each period i=1,2,3
and h is the value of the amount of housing purchased. ￿ is the intertemporal
discount rate and ￿ is the weight of housing in the utility of the agent. yi is the
amount of disposable income for each period, P is the amount of the repayment
on the mortgage. ￿ is the loan to value ratio, that is the proportion of the house
value that is ￿nanced with a mortgage and rb and ra are the interest rates on
loans and lending respectively.
The ￿rst constraint implies that the ￿rst period income must be at least as
large as the sum of non-housing consumption and the amount of the downpay-
ment for the purchase of a house. The second constraint implies that income in
the second period plus any savings from the ￿rst period (1+ra)[y1￿c1￿h(1￿￿)]
must ￿nance consumption in the second period and the corresponding part of
the mortgage installment. Finally, the third period restriction states that the
￿nal period income plus any remaining savings must be at least as large as the
9sum of ￿nal period consumption c3 and the ￿nal installment of the mortgage
[￿h(1 + rb) ￿ P](1 + rb):
A short (one period) mortgage maturity implies a contract in which P =
h(1+rb). A two-period maturity implies a contract where the agent can choose
the amount P in the second period and the remained of the debt in the third
one. in what follows, we discuss the implications of changes in mortgage length
and interest rates. The analytical results are presented in Appendix 1.
The allocation of consumption and housing depends on the level of maturity
set by the bank. We use the shorthand notation c1(m);c2(m);h(m) and ￿(m)
when m=1,2 for the optimal consumption and borrowing stream with maturity
equals 1 and 2, respectively. Result 1 compares both allocations.
Result 1: Under the previous assumptions, a consumer who is allowed to
repay in mortgage during the second and third periods chooses a level of c1;c2;
and h that is not lower than the optimal one if required to repay during one
period.
When consumers can only obtain one-period mortgages and the income in
the third period is high enough with respect to lifetime incomes (see Footnote













The corresponding expression for c1(2), or the level of ￿rst-period consump-



















When maturity equals 2, the level of consumption in the ￿rst period is pro-
portional to the value of the stream of income in periods 1, 2 and 3, discounted
at the interest rate rb. When maturity equals 1, and the consumer has pref-
erences for consumption that result in zero wealth holdings at the end of the
4The result arises if consumers end up period 2 with no assets. Given the assumption of
ra < rb, there will be a positive mass of those consumers.
10second period, ￿rst period non-housing consumption is a function of the dis-
counted stream of earnings during the ￿rst two periods only. Hence, if income
in the third period y3 is large enough relative to income in the ￿rst two periods
of life y1 and y2, allowing the consumer to repay in two rather than in one period
only results in a higher level of consumption: c1(2) is not lower than c1(1): An
additional repayment period allows a credit constrained consumer to increase
￿rst period consumption by borrowing against the whole future earnings stream
rather than against the earnings during the ￿rst two periods. Clearly, the result
hinges on two assumptions: income during the third period is relatively large
and interest rates of borrowing exceed those of saving -that guarantees that
some consumers end up with zero wealth in the second period of life.5
Result 2: Credit constrained agents who are allowed to repay over two periods
choose a higher level of ￿ than if required to pay during 1 period: ￿(2) ￿ ￿(1)
Using the ￿rst-period budget constraint, one notices that, holding interest
rates and the discounted earnings stream constant the increase in the level of
non-housing consumption during period 1 must be ￿nanced by a higher level
of borrowing during the ￿rst period of life of the mortgage. When allowed to
repay the mortgage in two periods the credit-constrained consumer increases
both h and c1, but the total outlay in housing expenses during the ￿rst period
falls because ￿(2) ￿ ￿(1).
2.1.1 A benchmark: perfect access to credit markets
A natural benchmark to understand the impact of mortgage maturities on the
allocation of consumption is to assume that agents can access credit markets
perfectly, or ra = rb Under the assumption of perfect access to credit markets at
an interest rate that is the same for saving and borrowing, the main determinant
of consumption is the sum of lifetime earnings discounted by the interest rate -for
example, the unconstrained consumer could always borrow in period 2 against
5Similarly, one can show that an expansion in maturity allows credit constrained consumers
to expand the consumption of housing h - h(2) > h(1) and of second period non-housing
expenditure c2(2) > c2(1)























Finally, after comparing cu
1, c1(1) and c1(2) we obtain an additional testable
result
Result 3: A drop in the interest rate increases relatively more the ￿rst-period
non-housing consumption of non-credit constrained consumers than that of credit
constrained consumers.
The result is proven in Appendix 1 and is driven by the larger wealth ef-
fect of an increase in interest rates when the whole lifetime earnings stream is
discounted than when discounting applies only to the ￿rst two periods.
2.1.2 Testable implications
The discussion above highlights two testable implications. In the presence of
credit constraints (i.e., rb > ra), the e⁄ects of changes in mortgage maturity
and mortgage interest rates on consumption di⁄er among consumers.
￿ For unconstrained households, increases in mortgage maturity have no
impact on either the level of consumption of homeowners or the loan-to-
value ratio. @c1
@r < 0; @c1
@M = 0
￿ Within the set of credit constrained home owners, those who have high
income growth late in life react to increases in maturity by expanding
the level of consumption. The consumption response of such subset of
households to the interest rates is negative, but weaker in absolute value










6Two notes are in order. We are not allowing for re-sale and we do not model the timing
of the purchase decision. Nevertheless, credit conditions could potentially a⁄ect the timing
of the purchase. In the empirical part, we discuss how we can control for selection into house
purchase using a mortgage and thus obtain consumption responses conditional on purchase.
Second, we characterize credit-constrained consumers as those for whom rb is greater than
ra.(the rate at which one can save). But one may think of alternative de￿nitions, like a
constrain that imposes a maximum ratio of the debt service to current household earnings.
While we have not proved the result analytically, we strongly suspect that such alternative
123 Data and empirical strategy
This section describes the data used for the analysis and the empirical strategy.
3.1 Data
We use data of the 2002 and 2005 waves of the Spanish Survey of Household
Finances (EFF, by its Spanish initials). The EFF is a tri-yearly survey of 5,143
households (in 2002) and 5,962 households (in 2005). 2,580 of these are panel
households, interviewed in both surveys. We use information about the real
assets held by the households and, in particular, the information about the
mortgages that ￿nanced the purchase of real estate (either the main residence
or a secondary one). The EFF collects information about up to 13 mortgages
for four real estate properties of each household. For the ￿rst property the
respondents are asked about the details of at most four mortgages. If they
purchased additional real estate properties using an outstanding loan, the EFF
collects information on up to three mortgages per property.
Consumption measures: The EFF contains broad questions about food ex-
penditures, non-durable consumption and about purchases (and holdings) of
vehicles and housing equipment. Much of our study is devoted to analyzing how
consumption responds to higher current "cash-on-hand" income associated to
smaller mortgage installments. Given that items like durable purchases are more
likely to be income-sensitive than other expenses, we follow Bover (2006) and
experiment with three consumption measures that incorporate durable goods
expenditure in di⁄erent forms. The ￿rst measure is non-durable expenditure.
The second is non-durables plus an imputation of durables consumption based
on depreciation rates for the US.7 The third measure adds non-durable plus
modellign device would deliver the same testable predictions. The reason is that an increase
in mortgage maturity would result in a reduction of the amount that must be paid during
the early years of a loan, possibly leading those consumers who are close to the credit limit
to expand consumption and to increase their leverage. Hence, the consumption of credit con-
strained households should still react more to changes in mortgage maturity than to changes
in the interest rate.
7We measure the ￿ow of durable consumption as 0.15 times the value of household equip-
ment expenditure and 0.165 times the value of the stock of vechicles.
13actual purchases of vehicles and housing equipment over the last two years.
Credit conditions at purchase: The EFF collects information about the year
and purchase price of up to 4 real estate properties. For each mortgage, house-
holds are asked to report the initial value of the mortgage, its initial duration
(or maturity), whether the interest rate is ￿xed or variable and its current level.
We impute the initial value of interest rates at the moment of purchase. When
interest rates are ￿xed, we use the current rate as the initial one. For vari-
able interest rate mortgages -around 90% of loans during the latter part of the
sample- we subtract from the current interest rate the average Euribor in the
period of the interview and add the average one during the year of the purchase
Permanent income: We proxy permanent income with an average of the in-
come observations normalized to the age of 45 of the household head. Respon-
dents report at least two measures of income: the sum of income components
of all members during the year prior to the interview (2001 for the 2002 wave,
2004 for the 2005 wave) and a measure of annual current income obtained by
multiplying by 12 the current monthly income of all household members. For
panel households we have up to four income observations. Appendix A.2. gives
the details of how we standardize by age and household size.
Sample selection: We use a sample of owners who purchased any of their
real estate properties before the age of 65 and have at least one mortgage out-
standing - we do not know the credit conditions if the loan is already repaid.
We consider house purchases after 1991. The average maturity in the beginning
of the nineties was about 15 years, so the restriction eliminates unusually long
mortgages signed during periods when the typical maturity was short. We also
exclude owners who have very short mortgages (below 10 years). For panel
households, we keep only one observation: the earliest observation of consump-
tion after having signed the mortgage with the longest maturity.8 Finally, we
consider only households whose consumption-income ratio is above the 3rd or
below the 97th centiles.9
8We assume that the longest maturity mortgage has the largest impact on consumption.
9In the TSLS speci￿cation we show, we included more observations to maximize the number
of cases in the ￿rst stage equation for interest rate and maturities. There, we only screen
14The average ￿nal sample size is 1,517 households in the OLS speci￿cation.10
The total number of buyers, including those without a mortgage, after 1991 is
3,356. Table 1 provides a description of the variables considered, separated by
education group. As we discuss in the next section, education is the main sample
split. The average age at purchase of the group with the lowest educational level
is 46, while groups with high school or college purchased on average at 40. The
interest rate charged also falls with the education of the household head (5.27%
for basic schooling, 4.89 for college heads). In addition, indebted households
have a very low non-durable consumption to (pre-tax) earnings ratio: the mean
is about 47 percent for households headed by an individual with either low
or medium education, and it is even lower among college head households (36
percent).
3.1.1 Characterizing credit constrained households
The model sketched in Section 2 gives indications about what groups of the
population are most likely to be a⁄ected by changes in the maturity of a mort-
gage. Consumption responses to maturity should be larger among groups of the
population with higher-than average income growth late in life (because it is ac-
cessing to the earnings of those ages that allows extended mortgage maturities
to have an impact on consumption) and pay higher interest rates on their loans
than the rest of the population (because a di⁄erential in interest rates leads
households to end up without assets at the end of the second period). This
section provides evidence that income growth and interest rates di⁄er across
education groups, providing the basis for our main sample split. In Section 5
we provide an alternative sample split based on household income.11
observations above the 99th percentile or below the 1st centile. The results were not a⁄ected
much.
10The EFF imputes the variables that households do not answer by multiple imputation,
so there are ￿ve datasets for each wave. All the estimates shown below are the average of
the estimates in each of the ￿ve di⁄erent samples, with standard errors corrected for the
uncertainty across replicates. As the imputed information varies across samples, some of the
restrictions we apply to the data vary across samples. Thus, we document average sample sizes
that may contain decimals. See http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/e⁄/userguide.pdf
11The literature has used partitions to examine the prevalence of credit constraints di⁄erent
from education, like current income or assets at the time of the purchase. We mainly have
15Income growth The ￿rst column of Table 2 shows the results of an OLS
regression of household-speci￿c income growth between 2002 and 2005 on age
of the household head (minus 45), two dummies of educational attainment of
the head (basic schooling and high school, college being the omitted group), the
number of adults in the households in 2002, an indicator of female head and
interactions between education and age. We use a subsample of 1,013 households
who did not experience any change in the number of adults during the three
year period. Table 2 suggests that income growth is higher among households
with a head with college degree than among households headed by an individual
with primary school (15 percent lower). Households headed by an individual
with high school have also lower income growth than college head households
(8 percent) but the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant. Importantly for
our purposes, the interaction between age of the head and high school is .0117
(standard error: .006), positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 6% con￿dence
level. In other words, at later ages -or for earlier cohorts- income growth is higher
among high school graduates than among college graduates.
Table 2 Panel B column 1 shows the predicted income growth at age 55
for a household headed by a male and 2 adults. The estimated income growth
between 2002 and 2005 for a household headed by a male individual aged 55 with
low education was minus 15 percent (standard error: .067). Predicted income
growth is also negative for households with a head with college (minus 9 percent,
with an standard error of 5.2 percent). Nevertheless, households headed by an
individual with high school experienced an income drop of 6 percent, statistically
not di⁄erent from zero. That evidence suggests that mature individuals with
mid education levels were the only whose income did not fall between 2002 and
2005.12
Interest rates Table 2, column 3 correlates interest rates charged on mort-
retrospective information and the EFF does not report what household income or assets were
at the time when the mortgage was signed.
12There is other evidence from the EFF pointing at overall negative household income
growth in a sample of "homogeneous" households -see Bover, 2008. There is also evidence
suggesting declining returns to college in Spain after 1995 -see Izquierdo and Lacuesta, 2006.
16gages and education and demographics. The dependent variable is the household-
speci￿c average mortgage interest rate paid for all mortgages, weighted by loan
size. We regress that household-speci￿c rate on the age of the head, his or
her education level, the level of current household income and household com-
position dummies (not shown). The results suggest that households headed
by individuals with mid education levels pay 21 bp more than the rest of the
educational groups.
Summarizing, the group of households headed by an individual with high
school is the most likely to react to changes in mortgage maturity.
3.2 The empirical strategy
We estimate the following equation for households with an outstanding mort-
gage:






Rh;g￿g + Dt + ￿Xh + f(agepurchase) + "h (4)
where Mg is the maturity of the mortgage, Rg is the interest rate at the moment
of purchase, Dt are 3 dummies indicating the year of the interview (2003, 2005
or 2006), and Xh is a set of covariates described below. Maturity and interest
rates are interacted with education dummies ￿our proxy for credit constraints.
From the reference model, we expect ￿g to be positive for credit-constrained
households only (the middle-education group). Conversely, ￿g ought to be neg-
ative for the rest of the households. In the empirical speci￿cation, we include
maturity and interest rates as the main e⁄ects, and interact those variables with
basic school and college indicators. Hence, the main e⁄ects of Mh;g and Rh;g
capture the impact for households headed by an individual with a high school
degree.
Xh includes a set of controls. The ￿rst is a set of variables aimed to pick
up the life-cycle pattern of consumption. It contains the gender of the reference
person, its marital status, 5 dummies indicating the size of the household and the
number of adults. The second set contains indicators for current resources: the
17current job situation of the reference household and of the spouse and current
income. Finally, we condition on other credit conditions at purchase, like the
year of purchase of the house (3 dummies for each year of purchase, the reference
group being purchases between 1991 and 1993) and whether or not the loan was
￿xed-rate. Year of house purchase and year of interview are included to capture
the aggregate interest rate, thus guaranteeing that Rh;g picks up cross-sectional
variation in spreads. We also include the age of the head at the time of purchase
of the house. Now, controlling for year of purchase, age at purchase and current
year precludes us from estimating life-cycle e⁄ects on consumption associated to
the age of the household head. To capture such life-cycle e⁄ects, we construct a
variable that takes the age of the spouse for married households and age of the
head for other households.
Two main problems that arise when estimating equation (1): the endogeneity
of mortgage maturity and interest rates, and sample selection into the sample
of indebted buyers. We discuss those issues now.
3.2.1 Selection and two step strategy
Equation (1) is computed on the selected sample of house buyers with an out-
standing mortgage. Within the 80% of households who own their house of
residence, a signi￿cant fraction of home owners purchased their home of resi-
dence without borrowing in the credit market (20%). The share of households
who did not borrow to purchase their secondary real estate property is even
higher: 46%. To estimate consumption responses that control for selection into
borrowing, we need to hold tastes constant and identify variation in mortgage
access that comes from bank lending practices. We use information about credit
rejections to identify households who wanted to have credit but could not have
credit because of bank decisions (see Jappelli, 1990 for a similar reasoning). The
EFF asks individuals whether or not they had applied for a loan during the last
two years, the reason not to apply and if some of the loan applications were
totally or only partially rejected, the latter being the case if banks gave a lower
amount than that requested by the household.
18We estimate ￿rst a selection model using a sample of house owners, distin-
guishing whether or not they have a mortgage on their house. We impute the
interest rate and maturities at the time of the purchase using mean interest
rates at the time of purchase among broad education and age groups. The rest
of the regressors is the set of covariates Xh, as well as three variables to control
for selection. The ￿rst identi￿es potential demand for credit and is an indicator
of whether the individual applied for a loan during the last two years or did not
because of fear of being rejected. This variable is also included in the consump-
tion equation. The second is an indicator of either actual rejections (some of
the loans requested were rejected) or anticipated rejections (did not ask for a
loan because felt that would be rejected). The third is an indicator of partial
rejections (the applicant was given less credit than asked for). Using the results
from that Probit, we construct a Mills ratio that is subsequently included in (4)
as a selectivity correction term. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional
of loan application and the covariates we use, the consumption of owners with
and without mortgages would have been the same if all their loan applications
had been accepted.
3.3 Endogeneity and instrument choice
An additional problem is that both mortgage maturity and the interest rate are
likely to be correlated with unobservable factors that also a⁄ect consumption.13
To solve the problem of endogenous maturity, we exploit the fact that banks
are reluctant to award a maturity level that involves paying once the household
head is above 65. After age 65 income is expected to fall (due to retirement)
and mortality (and the bank expected loss) increases. Furthermore, banks tend
to o⁄er mortgage maturities that are often rounded to a 0-5 multiple. We argue
that those two rules create arguably exogenous variation in maturity.
We start by documenting the ￿rst fact. Graphs 1 and 2 show the histogram
13Credit conditions are the result of a match between banks and customers. Households that
are better at ￿nancial planning could spend more time looking for better deals and sustain a
higher level of consumption. On the other hand, banks screen customers using characteristics
that we do not observe in the data, but that positively correlate with consumption, such as
the assets held by the household at the moment of the signing the mortgage.
19of the expected age at mortgage maturity -that is, the sum of age at purchase
and the initial maturity of the mortgage. Splitting the sample by the year
at which the mortgage was signed, one notices that after 1998 there was an
increase in the average age at which the mortgage expire. Yet, banks seemed to
be reluctant to award maturities that imply that the household keeps on paying
after the head is 65 years of age.14 Moreover, using the administrative data from
the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) for year 2003, we plot the number
of all the mortgages signed in Spain in that year, and their maturities. Graph
3 shows that there is considerable accumulation at durations like 5, 10, 15, 20
years.
The instrument for maturity we use is a variable that rounds to the closest 5-
multiple of the distance from 65 years the age at which the household purchased
the house. The idea is that if a buyer obtains a mortgage when he or she is
30, he/she will receive a mortgage with a maturity of 35 at most, while if
s/he asks a mortgage at 33, s/he will receive a 30 year mortgage. Hence, we
use as an additional identifying source of variation the age at purchase plus
variation that is due to the fact that if a household who purchases a house
at an age that is a multiple of 5 is likely to obtain in a maturity longer than
another household whose age at purchase is slightly higher. The "rounded"
variable has an advantage over an alternative instrument that equals "65-age
at purchase": the latter is very similar to year-speci￿c linear age e⁄ect. To
clarify, identi￿cation is obtained through changes in the age pro￿le of maturities
according to the year of purchase. Thus, in the second stage, we can control
for age and year of purchase separately, as the parameters are identi￿ed by the
interaction between both variables. The model we estimate is
14There seems to be a peak in the age at the maturity of loan at age 55, even higher than
that at 65. Unlike the peak at 65, the accumulation at 55 is substantially reduced when we
use sampling weights to compute the histogram (not shown). This lead us to suspect that the
fact that the EFF oversamples the wealthy includes a few observations on individuals with
low maturities that create bunching at 55. Given the size of the sample, and the selection
process, we preferred to show unweighted estimates.






Rh;g￿g + Dt + f(agepurchase) + Xh￿ + "h (5)
Mh = ￿0+￿1j65￿age_pj￿POST98h+￿2POST98h+￿3j65￿age_pj+￿Xh+Dt+Xh￿1+uh
(6)
j65 ￿ age_pj is a variable that rounds the distance to 65 to the smallest
multiple of 5. POST98 is a dummy that takes value 1 if the house was purchased
after 1998. The use of 1998 as the dividing year is based on the observation
that mortgage maturities increased after that year. Dt is the year of purchase
and Xh contains the rest of covariates detailed above.
Instrumenting interest rates. Interest rates are also potentially a⁄ected by
endogeneity biases. We use as an instrument the average interest rate spread
by year of purchase (4-year periods) age of purchase (below or above 45) and
education category (3 education groups). For each cell identi￿ed with these
variables, we imputed the average spread computed in the same way as described
in Section 3.1, assuming therefore that the spread was exogenously determined
from the market and not driven by the household choices.
A related issue is that in order to check for the heterogeneity in the responses
of credit constraints household in equation (1) we have to interact maturity and
interest rates with education dummies. Therefore, these interactions are also
endogenous variables, and instruments for these variables can be found in the
interaction of the proposed instrument, distance from 65 and the interaction
with purchase years, with education dummies. The system of equations (5) and
(6) is estimated using TSLS
4 Results
This section provides the results for di⁄erent estimation strategies. First, we
assume that interest rates and loan maturity are exogenous and that the sample
of house owners with a mortgage is random. We relax each of those assumptions
21by controlling for selection ￿rst and instrumenting maturities and interest rates
secondly. The ￿nal speci￿cation controls both for endogeneity of interest rates,
mortgage maturity and sample selection using TSLS. Finally, we examine di⁄er-
ent speci￿cations in order to understand who the credit constrained households
are, and also focus on the loan to value channel that is an important aspect of
consumption. In all cases, the estimates shown are the average of the 5 di⁄erent
imputations that the EFF sta⁄ does to address the problem of item and unit
non response. The standard errors shown are also corrected for the fact that we
are using ￿ve implicates.15
4.1 The impact of maturity and interest rates on con-
sumption assuming exogeneity
Table 3, column 1, rows 1-6 presents the impact of maturity and interest rates
on the log of non-durable expenditure for households with di⁄erent education
levels. The estimation method is OLS and there is no control for sample selection
into borrowing. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. In column
4 we add consumption components that may be specially sensitive to "cash-in-
hand" like the imputed consumption of vehicles and housing equipment and in
column 5, actual expenditure on vehicles and housing equipment over the last
two years. As the expenditures in housing equipment and vehicles of constrained
households are likely to be specially sensitive to "cash in hand", comparing
responses across consumption items gives insights about the role of access to
credit markets.
The impact of interest rates for the college education group is shown in Table
3, column 1, row 4 and amounts to -0.047 (standard error of 0.0126), statistically
signi￿cant from zero at the 1 percent con￿dence level. Conversely, maturity has
a negative e⁄ect on the consumption of that group: the coe¢ cient in Table 3, row
1 column 1 suggests that an additional year of mortgage maturity diminishes
the log of non-durable consumption by .0096 (standard error of 0.003). The
15Namely, the standard errors are the average of the 5 standard errors computed in each
replication plus a term that re￿ects the variability of estimates across implicates.
22negative impact on non-durable expenditure of maturity could be due to the
fact that college grads are younger than the average (and thus consume less)
and have accessed the mortgage market when longer maturities were available.16
We revisit the issue when we control for endogeneity.
Turning to the set of households with a high school head, we ￿nd that mort-
gage maturity level a⁄ects the non-durable expenditure of this group positively,
and that this di⁄erential response with respect to households with a college de-
gree is statistically di⁄erent from zero: .0118 (standard error: .005). An increase
in mortgage maturity of one year increases expenditure by .012-.0096=.0024 log
points (Table 3, column 3, rows 1 and 3). The magnitude is relatively small, as
an increase in maturity of 10 years increases non-durable consumption by 2.4%.
Interestingly, the non-durable expenditure of households headed by an individ-
ual with high school is una⁄ected by interest rates. Adding up the estimate in
Table 3, column1, rows 4 and 6 one obtains basically zero (.0469 -.050=0.003).
Rows 2 and 5 of Table 3, column 1 show the di⁄erential consumption response
of households headed by a person with low education to interest rates and
maturity (relative to heads with college degree). The consumption of this group
reacts neither to mortgage length (-.0096 + .002= -.0076) or to interest rates.(-
.0469 + .0450=-.0019).
Columns 3 and 5 of Table 3 present the response to initial mortgage condi-
tions of total consumption (i.e, non-durables plus the imputed consumption of
housing equipment and vehicles) and total expenditure (i,e, non durables plus
expenditure over the last two years in vehicles and housing). The pattern of
results con￿rms that the impact of interest rates on consumption is negative
only among households whose heads have a college degree. Conversely, the ex-
penditure of households whose head has a high school degree reacts to mortgage
length: Table 3, row 6, column 3 shows that an extra year of maturity increases
total expenditure by .005 log points (.013 - .008). The consumption of house-
holds headed by a person with basic schooling is insensitive to either maturity
16Ejarque and Leth-Petersen (2009) document that recent young home buyers in Denmark
have little savings to cushion against income shocks, possibly leading to a low consumption
level.
23or interest rates.
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that the responses of consumption
to mortgage maturities and interest rates di⁄er among groups of the population.
The size of the mortgage installments increases expenditure among households
headed by a person with high school and that group does not consume more
in response of better ￿nancing rates. That behavior is consistent with the idea
that credit constraints bind for that group. The determinants of consumption
within the group with college degree are those of unconstrained households:
consumption is lower among households with higher interest rates, but it is
insensitive to drops in the size of the yearly installment captured by longer
maturities.
4.2 Controlling for selection
The estimates in Table 3 do not account for the fact that the consumption
preferences of owners who borrowed to ￿nance their home purchase may di⁄er
from the rest of the population. We control for selection into borrowing using
information about the credit rejections of households who wanted to borrow but
could not because banks rejected their applications.17 Table A.2. in the Ap-
pendix shows the results of a Probit that identi￿es mortgage borrowing among
a sample of 3,356 house owners using the covariates in Table 3. Table A.2.
con￿rms that conditional on having applying for a loan, households who were
rejected have a lower chance of having purchased their house of residence with
a mortgage.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 report the OLS estimates of the impact on
consumption of maturity and interest rates on consumption, controlling for se-
lection. Table 4 adds two additional variables to the speci￿cation in Table 3:
a measure of "demand for loans" and the Mills ratio from the Probit in Table
A.2.. The results in Table 4 con￿rm the results in Table 3. We document a nega-
tive correlation between interest rates and consumption only among households
17The survey asks about credit rejections during the last two years only, not about rejections
at the time of purchase. We assume that the reasons that lead a bank to reject a credit
application are likely to stay over time
24whose head has a college degree. Conversely, the only group whose consumption
responds to mortgage maturity is that headed by a person with a high school
degree.
4.3 TSLS estimates.
The following step is to control for the endogeneity of maturity and interest
rates. We instrument maturity using changes over time in the age at mortgage
maturity, and interest rates using averages within broad age-education-year of
purchase cells. We start by verifying that those instruments have predictive
power.
4.3.1 The ￿rst stages: relevance of the instruments
Table 5 illustrates the results for the ￿rst stage regression of maturity (columns
1 and 3) and interest rates (columns 5 and 7) on the exogenous variables and the
instruments. Column 1 shows the determinants of mortgage maturity. The ￿rst
row of Table 5 shows the OLS coe¢ cient of the interaction of "rounded distance
to 65 at purchase" and "purchase after 1998" in a regression with maturity in the
left-hand-side. The magnitude of the interaction is 0.1007 (with a s.e. of 0.0348),
suggesting that an extra year of purchase reduces the maturity by around one
month. Interestingly, "rounded distance to 65" does not correlate with maturity
for purchases prior to 1998: the coe¢ cient is -.0428, with standard error of .0515.
Adding a selection term does not change the ￿rst stage: the coe¢ cient in Table
5, row 1 is virtually identical. Finally, the average interest rate seems not to
be related with higher maturity, reassuring us that what identi￿es variation in
maturity is the age at purchase and not other credit market conditions. The
F-test of "rounded age to 65" times "post 98" is 9.49, in the border of a weak
instrument.
Table 5, column 5 row 2 shows the regression of the interest rate variable on
the instruments. The coe¢ cient of the average interest rate spread by education,
age and year of purchase groups is .75 (standard error: .396). The estimate is
not statistically di⁄erent from 1, but it is not particularly precise. This creates
25a problem, as one of the instruments is weak. To check for the validity of
the TSLS inferences, we present robustness checks instrumenting maturity only
and replacing the individual interest rate with the average of the (spread of the)
interest rate in the year of purchase, schooling and age.
4.3.2 The causal impact of interest rates and maturities on con-
sumption
The impact of interest rates on non-durable consumption of high educated
households is shown in row 1 of Table 6 and are large, negative and impre-
cise. Households headed by an individual with a college degree reduce the log of
non-durable expenditure by -.2024 (standard error: .1546) when interest rates
increase by 100 basis points. On the other hand, one year longer mortgage matu-
rities has a negligible impact on the consumption of the college head households;
the estimated coe¢ cients are shown in row 4 of Table 5 and equal to -.01 (a .1
percent response of non-durable consumption to 1 more year of maturity) and
-0.012 for total expenditure. Neither estimate is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero
at conventional signi￿cance levels.
The di⁄erential response of non durable consumption to mortgage maturity
for the group of households headed by a mid-education household (relative to
college) is shown in row 3 of Table 5 and is 0.0425 (with a standard error of
0.019), suggesting that an increase in maturity of 1 year increases consumption
by 3.2% =(4.25-1) . The coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at a 5% con￿dence level. The
response of non-durable expenditures of the high school group to an increase of
100 bp is -.10 obtained by taking the di⁄erence between the estimates in rows
4 and 6 of Table 5 (column 1). The corresponding estimate for the group with
college was -.20. While not statistically di⁄erent the pattern of results is in line
with the theory. The fact that the timing of mortgage payments has a positive
e⁄ect on all the consumption measures of the "high school degree" group, but
interest rates have a smaller impact than for other groups is again consistent
with binding credit constraints for that group.
In rows 2 and 5 of Table 6 we show the impact of interest rates and maturity
26on the consumption of the low educated. In column 2 the estimated nondurable
consumption response to the interest rate for the low education group is -0.15
for non durables and -0.13 for total expenditure, much larger in absolute value
than the zero responses in Tables 3 and 4. Turning to mortgage maturity, the
non-durable consumption response can be obtained by adding up coe¢ cients in
column 1, rows 1 and 2 of Table 6 : the impact is 0.0048 (=.0148-.01), small
and not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The selectivity-corrected estimates in
Table 7 con￿rm the results in Table 6.
Summarizing, once we instrument interest rates and maturities, the con-
sumption response to one-year maturity changes by the "high school group" in-
crease dramatically, the interaction of maturity and high school increases from
the values around .01 in Tables 3 and 4 to values in the realm of .045 in Table
6 row 3 (all columns). The reactions of consumption to interest rates are much
larger in absolute value than those in Table 3 and lower among "high school
group" than among the rest of households. Nevertheless, those results must
be taken with care because TSLS estimates of the response of consumption to
interest rates are rather imprecise. Again "college" households resemble the
credit unconstrained group that reacts more to interest rates than to the size of
mortgage installments, while the "high school group" reacts mainly to mortgage
maturities.
Magnitude of the estimates We next assess how large the response of con-
sumption to maturity is among households headed by an individual with high
school. In Section 2, we provide a rough computation suggesting that an in-
crease in mortgage maturity of 10 years diminishes yearly payments by about
10% of the earnings of the average household. We reran the model in Table 6
column 1 but using the logarithm of the ratio of nondurable goods over earn-
ings. The coe¢ cient of that regression indicates the impact of mortgage credit
conditions on consumption as a fraction of current income. The coe¢ cient of
maturity interacted with high school head is .025 (standard error: .024). We
then predicted for each household the (log of the) consumption income ratio with
a maturity of 15 years and with a maturity of 25 years. The exponential of the
27average di⁄erence is 10%, slightly above the 9% reduction in payments. Hence,
the magnitude suggests that the whole reduction in installments is consumed
by house owners.
4.4 Robustness checks
Instrumenting maturity only: In Table 8 we perform two robustness checks. The
￿rst is to examine the robustness of the results when we instrument less vari-
ables. The ￿rst stage for the interest rate suggests a limited explanatory power
for the instrument of the interest rate. The average interest rate within the same
education-year of purchase and time of purchase group is indeed related to ac-
tual interest rates paid, but the F-test for than instrument was lower than 4. As
a robustness check, we try an additional model where we regress consumption
on maturity, the instrument for interest rate, and the rest of exogenous regres-
sors. We still instrument maturity using the variable "rounded distance to 65"
interacted with "post 98" dummy. The results are shown in the ￿rst Panel of
Table 8 and are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7.
The loan to value channel: The model we sketched suggests that credit con-
strained households use higher loan-to-value ratios to ￿nance consumption dur-
ing the early period of house ownership. Hence, we expect loan to values to
respond more to mortgage maturity among credit constrained households than
among the rest. Table 6 presents Tobit estimates of the impact of mortgage
maturity and interest rates on the loan-to-value ratios across education groups.
While the results may be a⁄ected by endogeneity biases - for example, interest
rates seem to be orthogonal to loan-to value ratios- the response of loan-to-values
is higher among households headed by a high school individual than among the
rest of households. That result is broadly consistent with the idea that the
"high school group" of house-owners ￿nance their consumption by borrowing a
higher share of the purchased house value against a longer period of remaining
earnings.
285 Alternative sample splits and the role of ￿-
nancial literacy
Splitting the sample by income Banks examine variables like income of the house-
hold when deciding to give a loan to a household. Hence, household income looks
like a natural sample split to identify di⁄erential access to credit. Unfortunately,
we do not observe household income at the time of requesting a mortgage, but
income in the year prior to the interview. Still, we split the sample of own-
ers by income during the year prior to the survey to examine income-speci￿c
consumption responses to interest rates and maturities. Namely, we split the
sample of home owners by income quartile and run group-speci￿c OLS regres-
sions of non-durable consumption on maturity, interest rate and the rest of the
covariates. Instead of controlling for income quartile, we include (log) perma-
nent and current income as linear terms to control for variation in income within
each group. We expect negative responses of consumption to interest rates in the
upper part of the income distribution, while consumption responses to maturity
in the lower part of the income distribution.
The results are shown in Table 9, rows 1 and 2. Log consumption is unre-
sponsive to mortgage maturity either in the very bottom of the income distri-
bution (the lowest quartile) or in the top quartile. We ￿nd a response for the
central two quartiles of the income distribution, where an extra year of maturity
increases log consumption by .8 percentage points (standard error: .53 pp). The
estimate is somewhat imprecise but very similar in magnitude to those in Tables
3 and 4 for the "high school group". Row 2 of Table 9 suggests that the only
group whose consumption correlates negatively with interest rates is that with
income in the top quartile. The magnitude of the interest rate response is -.07,
larger in absolute value than the .04 estimate for the "college group" in Tables
3 and 4. For the rest of the groups, consumption and initial interest rates are
unrelated.
Overall, Table 9 o⁄ers additional evidence of the existence of credit con-
straints among households with income in the second and third quartiles of the
29income distribution, whose consumption responds to mortgage maturity, but
not to interest rates. Households in the top quartile of the income distribution
show behavior similar to that of unconstrained households.
Credit constraints vs ￿nancial literacy An alternative explanation of our
results is that households with a high school degree have limited ￿nancial edu-
cation and thus are unlikely to understand what an interest rate is (see Lusardi
and Tufano, 2009) Hence, their consumption would not respond to interest rates,
as that concept is not part of their information set. While of course problems
with ￿nancial literacy are widespread and the issue merits further investigation
we have strong doubts that a lack of ￿nancial literacy explains our ￿ndings.
First, were ￿nancial literacy driving our results, the changes in the size and
timing of installments would a⁄ect the consumption level of the least ￿nancially
able: households with a basic schooling head. Nevertheless, the consumption of
the least educated is insensitive to mortgage maturity in any of the speci￿ca-
tions in the paper. Second, Lusardi and Tufano show that ￿nancial literacy is
correlated with overindebtedness. In our sample, the loan-to-value ratio among
the group with the lowest education level is as sensitive to the size of mortgage
installments as that of the most educated (college heads, see Table 8 Panel B).
Third, the TSLS speci￿cation does not rule out large consumption responses to
interest rates among the least likely to be ￿nancially able: the low educated.
Again, consumption responses to interest rates are admittedly imprecise, but
rather large among the least educated. Fourth, the evidence from income growth
in the later part of life ￿ts more naturally with a credit constraint story than
with a lack of ￿nancial sophistication.
6 Concluding remarks
Simple economic theory predicts that changes in mortgage market conditions,
like longer periods to repay or lower interest rates have a heterogeneous im-
pact on the consumption of home owners, and that such heterogeneity in the
responses is informative about the share of liquidity constrained households
30among house owners. In particular, the consumption of groups of the popula-
tion who are exposed to higher borrowing rates and who expect higher income
growth late in life should be specially responsive to mortgage maturity. Alter-
natively, the consumption of other, unconstrained, groups should react mainly
to changes in interest rates and is unrelated to the size of mortgage installments.
In this study, we use the 2002 and 2005 waves of the EFF, a Spanish Survey
with retrospective information about mortgage conditions, to estimate the re-
sponse of household consumption to cross-sectional changes in maturity and in
the spread of the interest rate over the Euribor.
We document that the consumption response to interest rates and maturities
is rather heterogeneous across groups of house owners de￿ned by their income
and education. The level of consumption seems to be related negatively to
interest rates only among the college educated. The consumption of groups with
high school attainment responds mainly to mortgage maturity. The evidence
is robust to the endogeneity of interest rates and maturity and for controls for
selection into borrowing. One interpretation of those ￿ndings is that households
whose head has a high school degree are credit constrained. Alternative sample
splits using household income suggest that consumption responses to changes
in the interest rate are con￿ned among home owners in the top income quartile.
We ￿nd some evidence of a response of consumption to mortgage maturity only
among house owners in the central quartiles of the income distribution.
One way to assess the magnitude of our estimates is to compute a share
of credit constrained households in Spain. The share of households headed
by a person with a high school degree as a fraction of the set households that
bought the house with a mortgage in the period 1992-2006 is 32%. Hence, credit
constrained households would be about 32% of relatively recent house owners or
8% of the total population. Both estimates are above what one would get using
credit rejection questions - around 3% of indebted households in our sample.
Do the patterns of consumption response to mortgage conditions hold in
thinner mortgage markets, like the Italian one? Take the alternative case of the
US, where loan re￿nancing is much more prevalent than in Spain. Do initial
31mortgage conditions determine there the level of household consumption? We
plan to address those issues by estimating the link between consumption and
credit market conditions using datasets from other economies.
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7 Appendix 1
This appendix gives details about the results in Section 2.
7.1 Consumption when mortgage maturity equals 1.













































while c3(1) = y3: In such allocation, one can show the following results:
Lemma 1 @c1
@(1+rb) < 0 if ￿ < 1 and
y2￿y1
y1 is su¢ ciently large






































Dividing both sides of the inequality by [y1 +
y2
1+rb] and rearranging, one
obtains that @c1
@(1+rb) < 0 whenever parameters satisfy (C1)
1 + ￿y



















y1 . The left hand side of (7) is 1 at most, increases with
second period income and falls with the borrowing rate rb The RHS of (7) is
the product of two terms.1
￿ and a second term that increases with ￿: Thus, an
increase in rb diminishes consumption in the ￿rst period if ￿y is su¢ ciently
large
Lemma 2 An increase in interest rates makes ￿(1) fall
Using the ￿rst period budget constraint, one can recover the expression for
the optimal loan-to-value ￿1
[￿
1







￿[y1(1 + rb) + y2]
= ￿(1)




















Both terms are negative. Hence, an increase in 1+rb leads to a drop in both
housing and non-housing consumption among buyers both through income and
substitution e⁄ects if ￿ < 1 and the income pro￿le su¢ ciently steep. Still, as
the fraction of housing ￿nanced through a mortgage drops unambiguously with
the interest rate a home buyer still needs to spend more on housing upfront
(1-￿)h, thus consuming less on the rest of (non-housing) goods.
347.2 Case 2: Consumption when mortgage maturity equals
2.
With two periods to repay the loan, the allocations of non-housing consumption



















































































Lemma 3 Maturity extensions increase c1(2) relative to c1(1) and c2(2) relative


















(1 + rb)2] = ￿2(rb)E3(rb)






























To establish the result, one needs to prove that
c1(1)
c1(2) < 1, or
￿1(rb)y2(rb)
￿2(rb)y3(rb) < 1:

























































This condition is more likely to hold when y3 su¢ ciently large relative to
the interest rate rb. The condition also guarantees that
c2(1)
c2(2) < 1
Lemma 4 An extension in maturity increases the loan-to-value ratio of home-
owners.
The loan-to-value ratio can be obtained from the ￿rst-period budget con-
straint:
(1 ￿ ￿(2))h = y1 ￿ c1(2)
Evaluating the expression at h(2) and h(1), one gets the result.




















The fact that an increase in mortgage maturity leads to an increase of both
the expenditure in housing and non-housing goods together with the fact that
the budget constrained must be satis￿ed implies that implies that 1￿￿2 < 1￿￿1,
or ￿1 < ￿2: The higher level of non-housing consumption is ￿nanced with a
higher loan-to-value ratio
Lemma 5 The response of consumption to the interest rate is higher among

















































































































(1 + rb)2 +
y3
(1 + rb)3]





8 Appendix 2: The construction of permanent
income
The measure of permanent income we use is an average of total income during
the years we observe the household, normalized for a household composed by 3
adult members whose head is 45 years of age as of 2002. For 55% of households
we have two consecutive yearly observations The ￿rst is the report during the
￿scal year of 2001 for the EFF2002 and that for 2007 for EFF2008. The second is
an imputation of monthly household income during the period of the interview,
based on direct questions on current income to all household members. We
multiply by 12 that report. For panel households, we have two extra data
points -two similar measures for the 2002 or 2005 wave. We use the sample of
households whose head is at most 70.
37To normalize permanent income, we regress current earnings on a 4th order
polynomial of age of the household head , education, and indicators of marital
status, the number of adults in the household and the number of children. The
point of including schooling is that there is substantial cross-cohort variation in
earnings. We make the hypothesis that education captures part of the variation
in the intercepts of those cohort pro￿les, so including them as regressors permits
us to identify the coe¢ cients of the age polynomial as measuring an average life-
cycle income pro￿le.
logyht = ￿0 + f(age ￿ 45) +
i=3 X
i=1
￿1+iSchoolhead + ￿4X +
t=2006 X
t=2003
Y ear + uh + "ht
where the error component has two elements: one that does not vary over
time and a second one that we assume to be iid. The measure of permanent
income is the following:
Yh = exp(￿0 + ￿1Schoolhead + uh)
38Table 1: Descriptive statistics, sample of owners with at least one mortgage
Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation T-Test Mean Stand. Deviation T-Test
(1) (2) (1)=(2) (3) (3)=(2)
Interest rate 5,427 2,289 4,890 2,088 4.8007 1.9405
Age of purchase 37,075 11,281 32,437 8,987 32.1323 8.5415
Maturity (years) 20,333 6,574 21,392 6,637 20.8917 6.2028
Mortgage 64.743 48.397 75.747 16.7397 ** 91.631 113.102 **
Original loan-to-value .89 .486 .826 .52 .70 .30 **
Fixed 0.135 0.342 0.169 0.375 0.1578 0.3648
Household income 32.642 21.348 36.079 40.898 ** 54.831 48.501 **
Non-durable/Income 0.467 0.242 0.453 0.251 0.3610 0.2472 **
Current age 46,620 12,075 39,844 9,219 40.1408 8.6547
Applied for a loan, last 2 years 0.467 0.500 0.498 0.501 0.4380 0.4965 **
Rejected partially/totally 0.031 0.172 0.050 0.218 0.0293 0.1683 *
Average sample size
Monetary magnitudes in 000s euro of 2006, all statistics are weighted using population weights and averaged across 5 replications
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves. Sample of 1517 house owners (on average) with at least one mortgage on one of their properties and who 
purchased their house before age 65 and between 1993 and 2006.Initial maturities are at least ten years long
2. Sample excludes cases when the imputed total yearly consumption over household income is above the 97th or below the 3rd centiles
3. An *,** in the T-test columns indicates whether the difference of means is significantly different from zero at the 10 ( 5) percent confidence level
Basic school
245.4 483.6 789
High school CollegeTable 2: Who is likely to be affected by increases in mortgage maturity?
Panel A: Household income growth and interest rates on mortgage, by education group
Dependent variable:
Estimation method: 
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of head minus 45 -.0079 .0048* -.0085 .0058 -.937 .585
Age head minus 45 * Primary .0091 .0064 .0082 .009 --
Age head minus 45 * High school  .0117 .0061* .0133 .0086 --
Primary school -.149 .0069*  -.047 .090 23.531 7.83**
High school -.0880 .061 -.088 .0725 19.11 4.84
Constant -.017 .041 -.063 .097 347.158 18.10
Panel B: Predicted household income growth and interest rates
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
Low educated -.150 .067* -.126 .071* 385.31 21.58
High school -.064 .063 -.0987 .0776 388.97 19.22
College -.0922 .053*  -.147 .079* 367.91 19.37
Sample size:  761
1. EFF 2002 and 2005 waves
2. The sample used in columns 1 and 2 is a panel of 1,013 households where the number of  adults stayed constant between 2002 
and 2005 and where the head is  between 18 and 65 years of age. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity
3. The sample used in Column 3 contains households with a mortgage and a head between 18 and 65 years of age. The estimates 
are not corrected for selection. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity
Interest rate on mortgages Income growth 2002-2005
1013
Predicted income growth Interest rate 
OLS WLS OLSTable 3: The OLS response of household consumption to initial mortgage conditions, by education
Coeff. St. Error Coeff.  St. Error Coeff. St. Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Maturity -0.0096 0.0035** -0.0110 0.003** -0.008 0.003**
2. Maturity*Basic school 0.0020 0.0054 0.0054 0.005 0.000 0.005
3. Maturity*High school 0.0118 0.0050** 0.0115 0.004** 0.013 0.005**
4. Interest rate -0.0469 0.0126** -0.0451 0.010** -0.045 0.012**
5. Interest rate* Basic school 0.0450 0.0167** 0.0373 0.014** 0.039 0.016**
6. Interest rate*High school 0.0501 0.0154** 0.0388 0.013** 0.049 0.015**
Rest of covariates
Age at purchase -65, rounded -0.0011 0.0033 -0.0013 0.003 -0.001 0.003
Basic school -0.3837 0.1630 -0.4399 0.135 -0.310 0.157
High school -0.5544 0.1456 -0.5116 0.119 -0.568 0.141
Female ref. person -0.1869 0.0666 -0.1946 0.057 -0.182 0.066
Household size 1 -0.4394 0.0823 -0.4051 0.069 -0.441 0.082
Household size 2 -0.2572 0.0403 -0.2195 0.035 -0.237 0.039
Household size 4 0.0763 0.0359 0.0670 0.030 0.066 0.035
Household size 5 or more 0.2347 0.0528 0.2010 0.045 0.223 0.052
Age below 35 -0.0922 0.0435 -0.0855 0.036 -0.078 0.042
Age between 46 and 55 0.1648 0.0498 0.1440 0.042 0.156 0.049
Age between 56 and 65 0.1213 0.0793 0.1249 0.067 0.096 0.078
Age above 66 0.0048 0.1595 -0.0099 0.134 -0.026 0.158
single 0.0195 0.0742 -0.0516 0.067 -0.016 0.075
divorced -0.0461 0.0817 -0.0272 0.068 -0.055 0.081
widow -0.0850 0.1344 -0.0954 0.111 -0.108 0.134
Year 2003 0.1972 0.0428 0.1403 0.036 0.180 0.042
Year2005 0.0672 0.0537 0.1012 0.046 0.077 0.053
Year 2006 0.1221 0.0397 0.1267 0.034 0.135 0.039
Bottom quartile current inc -0.1934 0.0634 -0.1784 0.052 -0.182 0.060
Third quartile current inc. 0.0150 0.0448 0.0217 0.035 0.021 0.043
Top quartile perm. Inc. 0.1000 0.0591 0.1315 0.047 0.105 0.057
Log of yearly expenditure on Log of non-durables Log of non-durables
non durable goods + imputed vehicles + furniture + expenditure on vehicles and furnitureTable 3 (cont.): The OLS response of household consumption to initial mortgage conditions
Coeff. St. Error Coeff.  St. Error Coeff. St. Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bottom quartile perm inc -0.1273 0.0489 -0.1229 0.040 -0.138 0.047
Third quartile perm inc. 0.0372 0.0466 0.0687 0.037 0.058 0.045
Top quartile perm. Inc. 0.3784 0.0553 0.4163 0.046 0.392 0.054
Year of purchase 94-96 0.0440 0.0623 0.0334 0.052 0.031 0.058
Year of purchase 97-02 -0.0082 0.0524 -0.0073 0.044 -0.008 0.048
Year of purchase 03-06 -0.0133 0.0425 -0.0120 0.037 -0.011 0.038
Spouse has no job -0.0019 0.0424 0.0095 0.036 0.012 0.041
Fixed interest rate -0.0340 0.0394 -0.0423 0.032 -0.028 0.038
Constant 9.8000 0.1466 10.1422 0.126 9.8012 0.143
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves. Sample of 1517 house owners (on average) with at least one 
mortgage on one of their properties and who purchased their house before age 65
and between 1993 and 2006.Initial maturities are at least ten years long
3. Observations censored when the imputed total yearly consumption over household income is above the 97th or below the 3rd centiles
4. Each coefficient is the OLS impact of the variable in each row on the consumption measure in the column.
 Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
The constant is the average log-consumption of a three person household where the head has a college 
degree and the spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age and who purchased their house before 1994
6. *(**): the coefficients in rows 1-6 are statistically different from zero at the 10(5) confidence level
Log of yearly expenditure on Log of non-durables Log of non-durables
non durable goods + imputed vehicles + furniture + expenditure on vehicles and furnitureTable 4: OLS responses to mortgage conditions, by education and controlling for selection
Estimation method: OLS plus a term accounting for selection
Dependent variable
Coeff. Standard error Coeff. Standard error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Maturity -0.0097 0.0035** -0.0090 0.0035**
2. Maturity*Basic school 0.0022 0.0054 0.0007 0.0053
3. Maturity*High school 0.0115 0.0050** 0.0127 0.0048**
4. Interest rate -0.0401 0.0120** -0.0376 0.0118**
5. Interest rate* Basic school 0.0447 0.0170** 0.0397 0.0163**
6. Interest rate*High school 0.0496 0.0156** 0.0493 0.0150**
Rest of covariates
Age at purchase -65, rounded -0.0031 0.0042 -0.0018 0.0041
Basic school -0.3834 0.1657 -0.3208 0.1590
High school -0.5352 0.1464 -0.5551 0.1416
Female ref. person -0.1787 0.0671 -0.1716 0.0664
Household size 1 -0.4229 0.0839 -0.4279 0.0835
Household size 2 -0.2560 0.0405 -0.2394 0.0392
Household size 4 0.0780 0.0358 0.0660 0.0354
Household size 5 or more 0.2361 0.0529 0.2198 0.0518
Age below 35 -0.0708 0.0546 -0.0745 0.0526
Age between 46 and 55 0.1400 0.0617 0.1490 0.0604
Age between 56 and 65 0.0689 0.1132 0.0823 0.1105
Age above 66 -0.0897 0.1516 -0.0594 0.1481
single -0.0005 0.0808 -0.0363 0.0811
divorced -0.0544 0.0811 -0.0689 0.0798
widow -0.1061 0.1340 -0.1231 0.1334
Year 2003 0.1917 0.0427 0.1765 0.0421
Year2005 0.0690 0.0539 0.0697 0.0528
Year 2006 0.1253 0.0405 0.1294 0.0401
Bottom quartile current inc -0.2068 0.0673 -0.1873 0.0640
Third quartile current inc. 0.0248 0.0448 0.0299 0.0430
Top quartile perm. Inc. 0.1059 0.0593 0.1117 0.0576
Bottom quartile perm inc -0.1285 0.0492 -0.1392 0.0476
Third quartile perm inc. 0.0336 0.0469 0.0564 0.0447
Top quartile perm. Inc. 0.3696 0.0554 0.3867 0.0547
Spouse has no job -0.0014 0.0428 0.0147 0.0417
Fixed interest rate -0.0202 0.0392 -0.0161 0.0378
Applied for a loan  -0.0091 0.0390 0.0241 0.0382
Mills ratio 0.0702 0.1227 0.0351 0.1210
Constant 9.7968 0.1501 9.7602 0.1476
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves. Sample of 1517 house owners (on average) with at least one 
mortgage on one of their properties and who purchased their house before age 65
and between 1993 and 2006.Initial maturities are at least ten years long
3. Observations censored when the imputed total yearly consumption over household income is above 
the 97th or below the 3rd centiles
4. Each coefficient is the OLS impact of the variable in each row on the consumption measure in the 
column. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
The constant is the average log-consumption of a three person household where the head has a college 
Non-durables Non-durables
 + exp. vehicles and equipmentdegree and the spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age and who purchased their house before 1994
6. *(**): the coefficients in rows 1-6 are statistically different from zero at the 10(5) confidence level
7. The Mills ratio is based on the Probit model shown in Table A.2 accounting for whether an owner 
financed the purchase of a house with or without a mortgage. The regressors in that Probit are the
same as shown in Table 2 plus three additional variables: whether or not the individual 
asked for a loan during the last two years or refrained to do so because s/he would be rejected, an
 indicator of whether the individual was either rejected or did not ask for a  loan because
he or she would be rejected an indicator of whether or not the individual was given less than askedTable 5: The first stage: the relationship between the instruments and maturity and Interest rates
Dependent variable:
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. 65 - Age purchase. rounded 0.1007 0.0348** .1038 0.0359** 0.0057 0.0117 0.0028 0.0118
* (House purchased after 1998)
2. Average interest rate (*) -1.5347 1.1113 -1.615 1.2644 0.7573 0.3962* 0.7852 0.3962*
Rest of covariates (included in all specifications, but only shown for specifications without the selectivity correction)
65 - Age purchase. rounded -0.0428 0.0515 0.0148 0.0168
65 - Age purchase. rounded * primary 0.0158 0.0434 0.0019 0.0120
66 - Age purchase. rounded * high school 0.0393 0.0434 0.0007 0.0114
Primary 1.8817 1.3514 -0.0904 0.3549
High School 1.0329 1.0883 -0.1635 0.2464
Female -0.2617 0.6381 -0.1908 0.1626
Household size 1 0.8922 0.7275 0.0383 0.1779
Household size 2 -0.0291 0.4193 0.0177 0.1055
Household size 4 0.4058 0.3692 -0.0226 0.1043
Household size 5 or more 0.4210 0.4967 -0.0254 0.1443
Current age below 35 1.9232 0.4224 -0.2197 0.1122
Current age 46-55 -1.4482 0.4574 0.2578 0.1347
Current age 56-65 -1.4209 0.7265 0.2794 0.1959
Current age above 65 -0.7193 1.1939 0.0839 0.3367
single -0.6173 0.7029 0.2056 0.1781
divorced 2.2020 0.7859 0.4463 0.2064
widow 2.1141 1.2668 0.2344 0.2327
Self employed -1.1896 0.3800 0.2574 0.1124
Unemployed -0.6093 0.6180 0.2542 0.1429
Retired 0.0476 0.7792 0.4279 0.2498
Other labor status 0.6683 0.8858 -0.2220 0.2257
Year 2003 0.6140 0.3861 0.7164 0.1389
Year 2005 2.1140 0.6027 0.0482 0.1537
Year 2006 0.8240 0.4058 -0.5182 0.1155
Bottom quartile -perm. income 0.2455 0.4905 0.3414 0.1597
Loan maturity Initial interest rateTable 5 (cont.): The first stage: the relationship between the instruments and maturity and Interest rates
Dependent variable:
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Third quartile -perm. Income -0.1560 0.4740 -0.0888 0.1255
Top quartile -perm. Income -0.3198 0.4255 -0.3136 0.1215
Year of purchase 94-96 -0.5771 0.7381 -3.5909 0.5415
Year of purchase 97-02 -6.8523 4.2644 -3.0575 1.5586
Year of purchase 03-06 -5.5587 6.5506 -3.0331 2.3609
nojobspouse 0.5209 0.4520 -0.1840 0.1102
Fixed interest rate -2.1027 0.4022 -0.9336 0.1652
Mills ratio -- -- .795 1.307 .594 .3873
Applied for loan, last two years -- -- 1.223 .422 .1733 .1280
Constant 30.6501 9.586 3.8806 3.4608
Average number of cases:
F- test (Age round-65 )* Post98=0
F test AvR=0
F- test (Age round-65 )* Post98=AvR=0
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves 
2. Sample of 1626.8 house owners (on average) with at least one mortgage on one of their properties and who purchased their house before age 65
and between 1991 and 2006. Maturities at least 10 years long
4. Each coefficient is the OLS impact of the variable in each row on the consumption measure in the column. Standard errors are corrected for
arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The reference group is a  three-person household where the reference person has an university degree, the
spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age and who purchased their house between 1992 and 1993
6. *,** imply that the coefficient of interest (shown in rows 1-2) are statistically different from zero at the 10 and 5 confidence level
7. The Mills ratio is based on the Probit model shown in Table A.2 accounting for whether an owner financed the purchase of a house with or 
without a mortgage. The regressors in that Probit are those in the first stage of Table 5 plus three additional variables: whether or not the individual 
asked for a loan during the last two years or refrained to do so because s/he would be rejected, an indicator of whether the individual was either rejected










1.76Table 6: TSLS responses of various consumption measures to initial mortgage conditions, by education
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Maturity -0.0101 0.0251 -0.0283   0.0218   -0.0120 0.0243
2. Maturity*Basic school 0.0148 0.0311 0.0211   0.0278   0.0174 0.0297
3. Maturity*High school 0.0425 0.0190 ** 0.0496   0.0166** 0.0483 0.0184**
4. Interest rate -0.2024 0.1546 -0.2052   0.1362  + -0.1781 0.1481
5. Interest rate* Basic school 0.0463 0.0420 0.0453   0.0389   0.0438 0.0408
6. Interest rate*High school 0.0930 0.0446 ** 0.0923   0.0394  ** 0.1047 0.0433 **
Rest of covariates
Age at purchase -65, rounded -0.0006 0.0047 -0.0002   0.0041   -0.0012 0.0045
Basic school -0.6349 0.8187 -0.7719   0.7421   -0.6691 0.7859
High school -1.4082 0.5786 -1.5696 0.5079   -1.5766 0.5628
Female ref. person -0.2492 0.0839 -0.2647   0.0756   -0.2385 0.0824
Household size 1 -0.4574 0.0862 -0.4312   0.0760   -0.4533 0.0846
Household size 2 -0.2482 0.0429 -0.2234   0.0380   -0.2307 0.0409
Household size 4 0.0840 0.0392 0.0841   0.0344   0.0762 0.0380
Household size 5 or more 0.2330 0.0573 0.2129   0.0506   0.2224 0.0550
Age below 35 -0.1541 0.0725 -0.1192   0.0628   -0.1324 0.0698
Age between 46 and 55 0.2178 0.0737 0.1757   0.0650   0.1978 0.0712
Age between 56 and 65 0.1544 0.0974 0.1382   0.0852   0.1123 0.0944
Age above 66 0.0362 0.1650 0.0083   0.1393   -0.0078 0.1616
Single 0.0483 0.0870 -0.0171   0.0818   0.0070 0.0867
Divorced -0.0402 0.1268 0.0106   0.1110   -0.0633 0.1232
Widow -0.0404 0.1596 -0.0287   0.1378   -0.0662 0.1570
Year 2003 0.3068 0.1241 0.2667   0.1078   0.2748 0.1191
Year2005 0.0778 0.0791 0.1392   0.0691   0.0869 0.0763
Year 2006 0.0423 0.0926 0.0608   0.0829   0.0717 0.0892
Log of expenditure on Log of non-durables + Log of non-durables +
non durable goods  imputed vehicles + furniture + expenses on vehicles and furnitureTable 6: TSLS responses of various consumption measures to initial mortgage conditions (cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Bottom quartile perm inc -0.1379 0.0797 -0.1432   0.0701   -0.1596 0.0750
Third quartile perm inc. 0.0611 0.0547 0.0985   0.0447   0.0842 0.0511
Top quartile perm. Inc. 0.3838 0.0674 0.4377   0.0591   0.4068 0.0656
Year of purchase 94-96 -0.5531 0.5814 -0.5696   0.5121   -0.4628 0.5548
Year of purchase 97-02 -0.9538 0.9150 -0.9325   0.8056   -0.7927 0.8762
Year of purchase 03-06 -1.2313 1.1610 -1.1459 1.0256 -1.0140 1.1143
Spouse has no job -0.0375 0.0548 -0.0260   0.0478   -0.0158 0.0527
Fixed interest rate -0.1409 0.1777 -0.1889   0.1534   -0.1126 0.1697
Constant 11.570 2.9617 12.2336 1.5008 11.3735 1.6420
Average number of cases
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves 
2. Sample of 1626.8 house owners (on average) with at least one mortgage on one of their properties and who purchased their house before age 65
and between 1991 and 2006.Initial maturities are at least ten years long
3. Observations where the imputed total yearly consumption is above 2.33 times the household income (top percent of the consumption to income ratio) 
or below 7% of household income (bottom percentile among home owners in the sample)
4. Each coefficient is the TSLS impact of the variable in each row on the consumption measure in the column. Standard errors are corrected for
arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The constant is the average log-consumption of a three person household where the head has an university degree and the
spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age and who purchased their house between 1992 and 1993
5. Instruments for mortgage maturity and its interactions with education group: Interaction of the variable "Age at purchase minus 65 rounded to the 
nearest multiple of 5" and an indicator for purchase after 1998 and its interaction with primary education and with high school education
The instruments for interest rate and its interaction with primary schooling or secondary education group
is the average interest rate within schooling group, age at purchase (above or below 45) and year of purchase (see text)
6. +,*,** imply that the coefficient of interest (shown in rows 1-6) are statistically different from zero at the 15, 10 and 5 confidence level
Non-durables (log) Log of non-durables Log of non-durables
+ imputed vehicles + furniture + expenses on vehicles and furniture
1626.8Table 7: Selectivity-corrected TSLS responses of consumption to initial mortgage conditions, by education group
Dependent variable:
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Maturity -0.0184 0.0257 -0.0365 0.0219 -0.0170 0.0247
2. Maturity*Basic school 0.0142 0.0315 0.0264 0.0272 0.0187 0.0300
3. Maturity*High school 0.0462 0.0192** 0.0541 0.0166** 0.0512 0.0186**
4. Interest rate -0.2182 0.1641 -0.1929 0.1420 -0.1858 0.1562
5. Interest rate* Basic school 0.0505 0.0415 0.0563 0.0366 0.0486 0.0398
6. Interest rate*High school 0.0992 0.0428** 0.1026 0.0365** 0.1099 0.0415**
Rest of covariates
Age at purchase -65, rounded -0.0069 0.0052 -0.0092 0.0045 -0.0065 0.0050
Basic school -0.6399 0.8230 -0.9397 0.7178 -0.7196 0.7858
High school -15,074 0.5731 -17,032 0.4913 -16,588 0.5567
Female ref. person -0.2391 0.0819 -0.2372 0.0725 -0.2241 0.0796
Household size 1 -0.4382 0.0911 -0.4019 0.0779 -0.4336 0.0883
Household size 2 -0.2491 0.0431 -0.2254 0.0374 -0.2323 0.0409
Household size 4 0.0903 0.0390 0.0916 0.0335 0.0803 0.0376
Household size 5 or more 0.2369 0.0573 0.2154 0.0489 0.2225 0.0547
Age below 35 -0.0778 0.0854 -0.0221 0.0718 -0.0755 0.0813
Age between 46 and 55 0.1275 0.0849 0.0557 0.0720 0.1273 0.0807
Age between 56 and 65 -0.0183 0.1515 -0.0914 0.1298 -0.0255 0.1444
Age above 66 -0.2275 0.2172 -0.3386 0.1852 -0.2180 0.2077
Single 0.0126 0.0889 -0.0786 0.0788 -0.0300 0.0878
Divorced -0.0238 0.1292 0.0036 0.1121 -0.0621 0.1249
Widow -0.0818 0.1562 -0.1008 0.1328 -0.1111 0.1524
Year 2003 0.3303 0.1384 0.2772 0.1177 0.2945 0.1323
Year2005 0.1120 0.0855 0.1774 0.0717 0.1116 0.0819
Year 2006 0.0634 0.0827 0.1074 0.0725 0.0937 0.0791
Log of yearly expenditure on Log of non-durables Log of non-durables
non durable goods + imputed vehicles + furniture + expenditure on vehicles and furnitureTable 7 (cted.): Selectivity-corrected TSLS responses of various consumption measures to initial mortgage conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Bottom quartile perm inc -0.1545 0.0710 -0.1783 0.0596 -0.1762 0.0669
Third quartile perm inc. 0.0539 0.0563 0.0922 0.0447 0.0783 0.0524
Top quartile perm. Inc. 0.3569 0.0825 0.4117 0.0715 0.3854 0.0791
Year of purchase 94-96 -0.5885 0.5992 -0.4897 0.5132 -0.4708 0.5700
Year of purchase 97-02 -0.9857 0.9349 -0.7839 0.8045 -0.7935 0.8915
Year of purchase 03-06 -1.2749 1.2002 -0.9926 1.0371 -10,423 11,456
Spouse has no job -0.0449 0.0583 -0.0316 0.0501 -0.0229 0.0558
Fixed interest rate -0.1551 0.1820 -0.1662 0.1552 -0.1142 0.1727
Applied for a loan, last 2 years 0.0466 0.0689 0.2594 0.1549 0.1628 0.1742
Mills ratio 0.1982 0.1822 0.1066 0.0577 0.0803 0.0656
Constant 11.926 1.914 12.2926 1.649 115,699 18,187
Average number of cases
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves 
2. Sample of 1626.8 house owners (on average) with at least one mortgage on one of their properties who purchased their house before age 65
and after 1991. Initial maturities are at least 10 years long
3. Observations with imputed total yearly consumption is above 2.33 below 7% of household income are excluded 
4. Each coefficient is the TSLS impact of the variable in each row on the consumption measure in the column. Standard errors are corrected for
arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The constant is the average log-consumption of a three-person household where the head has an university degree 
and the spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age and who purchased their house between 1992 and 1993
5. Instruments for mortgage maturity and its interactions with education: Interaction of the variable "Age at purchase minus 65 rounded to 
the nearest multiple of 5" and an indicator for purchase after 1998 and its interaction with primary education and with high school education
The instruments for interest rate and its interaction with primary schooling or secondary education group
is the average interest rate within schooling group, age at purchase (above or below 45) and year of purchase (see text)
6. +,*,** imply that the coefficient of interest (shown in rows 1-6) are statistically different from zero at the 15, 10 and 5 confidence level
7. The Mills ratio is based on the Probit model shown in Table A.2 accounting for whether an owner financed the purchase of a house with or 
without a mortgage. The regressors in that Probit are those in the first stage of Table 5 plus three additional variables: whether the individual 
asked for a loan during the last two years or did not because s/he would be rejected, an indicator of whether the individual was either rejected
or did not ask for a  loan because he or she would be rejected an indicator of whether or not the individual was given less than asked
1626.8
Log of yearly expenditure on Log of non-durables Log of non-durables
non durable goods + imputed vehicles + furniture + expenditure on vehicles and furnitureTable 8: Robustness checks
Sample:
Panel A: TSLS responses of non-durable consumption to mortgage maturity, control for average interest rate
Average interest rate -.091 .13 -.063 .14 -.129 .147
Maturity .013 .028 .0319 .0192* -.0112 .0290
Average sample size:
Panel B: The response of the loan-to-value to interest rates and mortgage maturity (Tobit estimates)
Interest rate .0033 .0115 .101 .008 -.0041 .005
Maturity .0122 .0035** .0178 .0025 .101 0.002
Sample size
Panel A: see notes to Table 7
Panel B:
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves 
2. Sample of 1688 house owners with at least one mortgage on one of their properties who purchased their house before age 65
and after 1991. Initial maturities are at least 10 years long but the sample is not screened for extreme consumption  values
4. Each coefficient is the Tobit impact of the variable in each row on the loan to value. We run three separate Tobit models
 for each education group and the set of regressors is the same as in Table 3.
5. +,*,** imply that the coefficient of interest (shown in rows 1-6) are statistically different from zero at the 15, 10 and 5 confidence level
527 282 879
Basic schooling High school College




Coeff.  St. Error Coeff.  St. Error Coeff.  St. Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Maturity -0.0105 0.0216 0.0080 0.0053+ 0.0012 0.0068
2. Interest rate 0.0291 0.0689 -0.0087 0.0235 -0.0723 0.0369**
Rest of covariates
Age at purchase -65, rounded -0.0127 0.0111 -0.0109 0.0054 0.0011 0.0073
Female -0.0381 0.4038 -0.1779 0.1829 -0.4382 0.2390
Household size 1 0.1757 0.4184 -0.1586 0.2329 0.0712 0.2444
Household size 2 0.4315 0.2865 -0.1358 0.0937 -0.1670 0.1123
Household size 4 0.1048 0.2877 0.0372 0.0817 0.1139 0.1051
Household size 5 or more 0.7871 0.4422 0.1175 0.1614 -0.0026 0.1528
Numb adults 0.1349 0.1867 0.0183 0.0566 0.0730 0.0597
Single -1.1155 0.5991 -0.0609 0.2115 0.0107 0.2374
Divorced -0.4372 0.4168 -0.1414 0.2161 0.3154 0.2505
Widow -0.7885 0.7715 -0.1589 0.3615 -0.0995 0.4355
Primary school -0.2491 0.3172 -0.1806 0.1005 -0.3223 0.1513
High school -0.0726 0.2880 -0.0684 0.0760 -0.1437 0.1005
Age below 35 -1.0752 0.3385 -0.3118 0.1934 -0.3989 0.4392
Age between 46 and 55 -0.3714 0.2421 -0.0228 0.0917 -0.1003 0.1271
Age between 56 and 65 -0.5006 0.3195 -0.1245 0.1571 0.0032 0.1574
Age above 66 -0.5035 0.6025 -0.4443 0.2550 -0.4207 0.3530
Self-employed -0.4547 0.3410 -0.0410 0.1109 -0.0136 0.0974
Unemployed 0.0723 0.3070 -0.0254 0.1466 -0.0323 0.2628
Retired -0.4636 0.4771 0.0901 0.1638 0.2886 0.2117
Student 0.0360 0.6333 0.1446 0.2102 0.4138 0.2270
Other labor status -0.4355 0.2809 0.0606 0.1042 -0.0571 0.1651
Spouse works -0.7207 0.3629 0.0873 0.0782 -0.1349 0.0962
Log current income -0.4267 0.1272 0.1675 0.1782 0.2277 0.1331
Log permanent income 0.7818 0.2816 0.3285 0.1607 0.3233 0.1307
Year 2003 -0.0442 0.5223 0.2389 0.1065 0.2398 0.1252
Year 2005 0.1668 0.3099 -0.1044 0.1157 0.0308 0.1344
Year 2006 -0.1536 0.2803 0.0684 0.0923 0.1456 0.1083
Fixed interest rate 0.4349 0.2494 0.0935 0.1628 0.2426 0.2244
Constant 8.7447 0.7775 8.5786 0.2287 8.6318 0.3260
Average sample size:
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves 
2. Sample of 1587,3 house owners (on average) with at least one mortgage on one of their properties 
who purchased their house before age 65 and after 1991. Initial maturities are at least 10 years long
4. Each column reflects a group-specific OLS regression of non durable consumption. Standard errors 
corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The constant is the average log-consumption of a three-person 
household where the head has an university degree and the spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age 
6. +,*,** imply that the coefficient of interest (shown in rows 1-6) are statistically different from zero at 
the 15, 10 and 5 confidence level
Two central quartiles Top income quartile
Log non-durable consumption
119.8 840 627.5Table A1: Evolution of credit conditions in Spain (EFF)
Before 1997 1998-2002 After 2003
1. Interest rate paid currently 4.658 3.920 3.512
(1.55) (1.01) (1.96)
2. Mortgage maturity 18.037 22.40 25.186
(5.088) (6.32) (6.450)
3. Loan to value ratios .7518 .879 .9169
(.44) (.43) (.38)
4. Fixed-rate mortgages .245 .122 .097
Sample size: 376 473 275
Source: Pooled 2002-2005 waves of the EFF. Only one implicate is used. Statistics weighted
Standard deviations in parentheses.Table A.2. The probability of being home owner with a mortgage
Estimation method: Probit
Dependent variable takes value 1 if the home owner bought the house with a mortgage, 0 otherwise
Coeff. St. error
Variables excluded from the consumption equations
1. Rejected or applied not for fear of being rejected -0.5938 0.2473**
2. Given less credit than asked for 0.6757 0.3750*
Variables included in the first stage of Table 7
Either applied for a loan, last two years or did not for fear of being rejected) 0.5765 0.0655
Age at purchase -65, rounded -0.0806 0.0097
Age at purchase -65, rounded * high school -0.0004 0.0103
Age at purchase -65, rounded * primary schooling -0.0023 0.0097
Age at purchase -65, rounded * House purchased after 1998 -0.0062 0.0091
Age at purchase -65, rounded * House purchased after 1999 * primary -0.0041 0.0109
Age at purchase -65, rounded * House purchased after 1999 * high school -0.0090 0.0098
Average Interest rate  0.1500 0.0826
Average Interest rate * Primary -0.0240 0.0670
Average Interest rate *High school -0.0462 0.0651
Primary schooling 0.0814 0.4361
High School 0.4465 0.3989
female 0.2245 0.1215
Household size equals 1 0.1178 0.1300
Household size equals 2 0.0287 0.0773
Household size equals 4 0.0382 0.0748
Household size equals 5 0.0803 0.1059
Age below 35 0.8160 0.0910
Age between 46 and 55 -0.9711 0.0819
Age between 56 and 65 -17,706 0.1154




Self employed -0.2162 0.0675
Unemployed -0.1802 0.1176
Retired -0.9970 0.1242
Other labor status -0.6054 0.1396
Year 2002 -0.0656 0.0749
Year 2005 0.1588 0.1167
Year 2006 0.1620 0.0748
Bottom quartile perm. Inc. -0.1915 0.0947
Third quartile perm. Inc -0.0761 0.0817
Top income quartile -0.2793 0.0823
House purchased 1994-1996 0.0830 0.1044
House purchased 1997-2002 0.9537 0.3006
House purchased after 2003 0.9423 0.4109
Spouse has no Job -0.1243 0.0961
Constant 17,044 0.6910
Average number of cases: 
1. Source: EFF2002 and 2005 waves 
2. Sample of 3356 house owners (on average)  who purchased their house before age 65 and between
3356 1991 and 2006
The dependent variable takes value 1 if the home owner acquired the house with a mortgage, 0 
otherwise
3. Each coefficient is the coefficient of the latent index. Standard errors are corrected for
arbitrary heteroscedasticity. The omitted group is a married couple with one child where the head
 has a college degree, the spouse is between 36 and 45 years of age and who purchased their house 
between 1992 and 1993
4. +,*,** imply that the coefficients of interest (shown in rows 1-2) are statistically different from zero 
at the 15, 10 and 5 confidence level330000
Year 2003, Administrative data
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